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Abstract 
Boredom research is booming. Nonetheless, a comprehensive understanding of boredom in 
relation to other negative emotions is lacking. This ambiguity impedes accurate interpretation 
of boredom’s causes and consequences. To gain more insights into boredom, we examined in 
detail how it differs from a range of other negative experiences, namely sadness, anger, 
frustration, fear, disgust, depression, guilt, shame, regret, and disappointment. Our research 
indicates that the appraisals associated with boredom distinguish it clearly from other 
negative emotions; conceptually (Study 1), in terms of state experiences (Study 2), and in 
terms of individual differences in these experiences (Study 3). Our findings suggest that 
boredom is mild in negative valence, low in arousal, is associated with low perceived 
challenge, low perceived meaningfulness, and has low relevance to moral judgment and 
behavior. Boredom also involves low attention given to situations and tasks, and the lack of 
perceived meaningfulness and attention associated with boredom emerged as particularly 
distinctive characteristics. The findings underscore the importance of carefully discriminating 
boredom from other emotions in experimental induction, psychometric assessment, and 
conceptual discussion. 
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Boredom Begs to Differ: 
Differentiation from Other Negative Emotions 
Between 1926 and 1980, on average less than one psychology paper per year was 
published on boredom (Smith, 1981; Fahlman, Mercer, Gaskocski, Eastwood, & Eastwood, 
2009). Between 2010 and 2015, no fewer than 1,422 psychology journal articles were 
published on boredom according to ScienceDirect (www.sciencedirect.com). Of these, as 
many as 326 were published in 2015 alone. Clearly, boredom research is gradually moving 
from the fringes of psychological science towards the mainstream. Yet, the surge in 
popularity of boredom research also increasingly exposes its key weakness: It is unclear how 
boredom differs from other negative affective states. This raises fundamental questions about 
the nature of boredom and the validity of its study: Does boredom differ relatively little or 
much from other emotions in terms of lay concept, as state experience, and on the basis of 
individual differences? Further, what characterizes these potential differences between 
boredom and other emotions? Inspired by initial forays into boredom’s distinctiveness (e.g., 
Goldberg, Eastwood, Laguardia, & Danckert, 2011; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Van Tilburg & 
Igou, 2012), and given the recent rise in popularity of research on boredom, investigating 
these issues is urgently needed. Before we set out our approach, we will first review the 
relevant boredom literature. 
Boredom 
Boredom has been a topic of scholarly discussion primarily within philosophy before 
it entered the realm of empirical study. In this philosophical literature, boredom was often 
treated as evidence of existential turmoil. Heidegger extensively discussed boredom in his 
work, and described it as an “insidious creature [that] maintains its monstrous essence in our 
Dasein” (cited in Thiele, 1997, p. 491). He linked boredom to modernism and people’s desire 
for technological change. An existential view of boredom can also be found in the writings of 
Schopenhauer, who dramatically claimed that the human capacity to experience boredom 
attests to the absurdity of life: 
Human life must be some kind of mistake. The truth of this will be sufficiently 
obvious if we only remember that man is a compound of needs and necessities hard to 
DIFFERENTIATING BOREDOM  4 
 
satisfy; and that even when they are satisfied, all he obtains is a state of painlessness, 
where nothing remains to him but abandonment to boredom. This is direct proof that 
existence has no real value in itself; for what is boredom but the feeling of the 
emptiness of life? (Schopenhauer, 1851, trans. 2009, p. 357) 
Fromm (1955) held a likewise unpleasant view of boredom, stating that “among all 
evils of life, there are few which are as painful as boredom” (p. 202). “I am convinced that 
boredom is one of the greatest tortures. If I were to imagine Hell, it would be the place where 
you were continually bored” (1963/2004, p. 150). Fromm believed that boredom resulted 
from people’s feelings of alienation, a state of lacking meaningful activities and relationships, 
and that boredom was a lead cause of aggression and destruction in society (Fromm 1972; 
1991).  
Other philosophers, including Sartre, Kierkegaard, and Kuhn (Martin, Sadlo, & Stew, 
2006), similarly cast boredom as a phenomenon intimately related to a lack of meaning and 
purpose, and this proposition resonates with Barbalet’s (1999) more recent sociological 
discussion of boredom, stating that “boredom is anxiety about the absence of meaning in a 
person’s activities or circumstances” (p. 641). Essentially, this literature emphasizes that 
boredom accompanies the negation of life’s meaning and purpose. 
From the Fringes Towards the Mainstream 
Boredom has received due empirical study in recent years. Much of this research 
focused on the psychometrics of boredom measures (Leong & Schneller, 1993; Vodanovich, 
2003; Fahlman Mercer-Lynn,Flora, & Eastwood, 2013). Other research focused on the 
relationships that boredom holds with relevant interpersonal (Dahlen, Martin, Ragan, & 
Kuhlman, 2004), educational (Watt & Vodanovich, 1999), psychopathological (Blaszczynski, 
McConaghy, & Frankova, 1990), or work-related variables (Kass, Vodanovich, & Callender, 
2001). 
Within this emerging field in psychology, boredom was recently defined as “the 
aversive experience of wanting, but being unable, to engage in satisfying activity” (Eastwood, 
Frischen, Fenske, & Smilek, 2012, 482). It is a common (Larson & Richards, 1991) and 
unpleasant emotion (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011). Boredom is physically expressed with a 
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collapsed upper body, leaning head, and limited bodily movement (Walbott, 1998). Its 
prototypical psychological signature features low arousal (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; cf. 
Goetz, Frenzel, Hall, Nett, Pekrun, & Lipnevich, 2014), a lack of perceived meaning and 
challenge in the activity at hand (Van Tilburg, Igou, & Sedikides, 2013), mind-wandering 
(Kane, Brown, McVay, Silvia, Myin-Germeys, & Kwapil, 2007), low attention (Eastwood et 
al., 2012), and the desire to change the current activity or to disengage from it (Van Tilburg 
& Igou, 2012). 
Correlational approaches to state boredom and boredom proneness confirm 
boredom’s undesirable character, evidencing correlates such as aggression, pathological 
gambling, depression, loneliness, anxiety, negative affect, reduced positive affect, hostility, 
anger, reduced work enjoyment, unhealthy eating, risky driving behavior, and many more 
(e.g., Blaszczynski et al., 1990; Buss & Perry, 1990; Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; Kass et al., 
2001; Koball, Meers, Storfer-Isser, Domoff, & Musher-Eizenman, 2012; Vodanovich, Verner, 
& Gilbride 1991). These phenomena are usually assumed to be consequences of boredom 
proneness, possibly propelled by variables such as sensation seeking or a lack of impulse 
control (Dahlen et al., 2004). 
Experimental studies of boredom, which have been far less numerous than 
correlational investigations, demonstrate that boredom is nonetheless functional: It facilities 
important self-regulatory processes, for better or worse. For example, the lack of perceived 
challenge entailed in the boredom experience (Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) facilitates the search 
for more challenging activity (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). Likewise, boredom “emotionally 
registers an absence of meaning and leads the actor in question towards meaning” (Barbalet, 
1999, p. 631), which can produce behaviors aimed at restoring a sense of personal 
meaningfulness. For example, boredom produces in-group favoritism and out-group 
derogation (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011), nostalgic reverie (Van Tilburg et al., 2013), more 
extreme political orientations (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2016), and sometimes even prosocial 
intentions (Van Tilburg & Igou, in press)—psychological responses that serve to increase a 
sense of purpose (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Routledge, Wildschut, Sedikides, Juhl, & 
Arndt, 2012; Van Tilburg, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2016). Further highlighting the self-
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regulatory processes that boredom instigates, research by Sansone, Weir, Harpster, and 
Morgan (1992) documented that boredom inspires task variations that regulate interest in 
activity. Moreover, recent findings indicate that boredom can even promote healthy eating 
behavior (Moynihan, Van Tilburg, Igou, Wisman, Donnelly, & Mulcaire, 2015), provided 
that the food in question is relatively exciting, a condition that is usually reserved for 
unhealthy food (e.g., Craeynest, Crombez, Koster, Haerens, & De Bourdeaudhuij, 2008). 
These experimental findings indicate that notwithstanding the various detrimental correlates 
and consequences that boredom has, it can also facilitate adaptive self-regulatory processes 
(Elpidorou, 2014). 
How Does Boredom Compare to Other Emotions? 
Despite the increased scientific interest in boredom and its wide scope of implications, 
the current understanding of boredom is unsatisfactory; an issue that many scholars have 
raised (see Eastwood et al., 2012; Leary, Rogers, Canfield, & Coe, 1986; Van Tilburg & Igou, 
2012; Vodanovich, 2003). Particularly striking is the lack of knowledge about the differences 
of boredom in relation to other negative emotions, with only a handful of studies considering 
other emotions alongside boredom (e.g., Goldberg et al., 2011; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; 
Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012).  
The few studies that measure boredom alongside other negative emotions indicate that 
boredom proneness correlates positively with, for example, anger, frustration, sadness, and 
feelings of depression (e.g., Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012; Vodanovich et al., 1991). In his book 
La Nauséa, Sartre sketches the contemplations of protagonist Antoine Roquentin, whose 
feelings of meaninglessness and boredom express themselves in a sense of nausea (e.g., 
Erfani, 2004). This work hints that even disgust, characterized by nausea (Schnall, Haidt, 
Clore, & Jordan, 2008), may overlap with boredom. The fact that boredom correlates with 
other negative emotions need not mean that boredom cannot be adequately distinguished 
from other negative emotions—it could well be that the typical circumstances that elicit 
boredom occasionally foster anger, frustration, sadness, feelings of depression, and possibly 
disgust. Unfortunately, however, the correlations between boredom and other negative 
emotions are accompanied by an overlap in several of their correlates and consequences. For 
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example, boredom proneness predicts aggression (Dahlen et al., 2004), but so do frustration 
(e.g., Miller, 1941) and anger (Maiuro, Vitaliano, & Cahn, 1987). Furthermore, although 
empirical work has confirmed that boredom involves a sense of meaninglessness (Fahlman, 
Mercer, Gaskocski, Eastwood, & Eastwood, 2009; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012), so do sadness 
and feelings of depression (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006). Likewise, boredom is 
linked to withdrawal behavior (Geiwitz, 1966), but so is disgust (Harlé, & Sanfey, 2010). 
These findings ultimately raise the question which features boredom shares with these other 
emotions and which features distinguishes boredom from them.  
Prior studies that plotted boredom against other emotions generally portrayed 
boredom as relatively distinct from other affective states. However, these studies are scarce 
and the methodologies used in them cast doubt on the conclusiveness of the results. For 
example, participants were typically supplied with various explicit dimensions on which 
emotions were compared, such as cognitive appraisals (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), or feelings 
and behavioral tendencies (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). Although these studies are important 
and insightful, they include crucial limitations: Examining differences/similarities among 
emotions on explicit comparison dimensions raises the risk of under- or overestimating the 
extent to which boredom differs from other negative emotions. For example, boredom 
significantly differs from sadness on ratings of perceived challenge (Van Tilburg & Igou, 
2012). Yet, it could be that compared to the similarities between boredom and sadness the 
dimension of perceived challenge differentiates very little between the emotions. Reversely, 
the absence of a significant difference between boredom and disgust on ratings of 
pleasantness (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) does not take away the possibility that these 
emotions differ in many other important facets.  
In addition, the few studies that examined whether boredom can be distinguished 
from other affective states included a very limited set of other states (anger, frustration, and 
sadness: Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012; apathy, anhedonia, and depression: Goldberg et al., 
2011). Furthermore, studies on boredom usually focus on either boredom as lay concept, state 
experienced boredom, or individual differences in boredom proneness, limiting the possibility 
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for obtaining convergent perspectives from different levels of analyses. Although these 
studies are valuable, they are unfortunately also limited in scope. 
We sought to establish the much needed empirical firmament for the study of 
boredom. We attempted to develop a foothold for understanding boredom by empirically 
testing whether and to which degree boredom could be differentiated from a range of other 
negative emotions. In the present undertaking, we examined boredom’s position relative to 
other negative emotions using three common classifications for boredom: as a concept 
(Barbalet, 1999), as a state experience (Fahlman, Mercer-Lynn, Flora, & Eastwood, 2013), 
and at the level of individual differences (Vodanovich, 2003). 
In studying how boredom compares to other emotions, we adopted a ‘prototype’ view 
of emotions (e.g., Fehr & Russell, 1984), where we see ‘boredom’, and other emotions, as 
encompassing a range of prototypical features that tend to cluster together (e.g., Hepper, 
Ritchie, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2012). Experiences sharing fewer (or less pronounced) 
prototypical features are judged as less representative of that emotion (e.g., less boring). 
What does this mean for the ‘distinctiveness’ of emotions? Although our prototype view does 
not assume strict boundaries between emotions, they can nonetheless be characterized as 
more or less different from each other. 
Current Research 
Differentiating Boredom 
In three Studies, we tested whether boredom can be differentiated (to a considerable 
degree) from a wide range of other negative affective states. Different from past studies, we 
did not start off with having participants compare boredom and other negative emotions on an 
explicit set of comparison dimensions. Rather, we first assessed the differences and 
similarities among negative emotions based on lay concept comparisons (Study 1), state level 
correlations (Study 2), and correlations between individual differences (Study 3), using a 
multidimensional scaling approach (Kruskal & Wish, 1978; Shepard, 1980). Afterwards we 
tested whether or not various comparison dimensions drawn from existing boredom literature 
corresponded to these obtained differences/similarities (Study 1-3; Rusbult, Onizuka, & 
Lipkus, 1993).  
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Resonating with the different levels of analyses in prior research (concept, state, 
individual differences), we examined boredom’s differences/similarities amongst negative 
emotions at these levels. In Study 1, we explored how different/similar people consider the 
concept of boredom to be relative to 10 other negative emotions (sadness, anger, frustration, 
fear, disgust, feeling depressed
1
, guilt, shame, regret, and disappointment). In Study 2, we 
tested how different boredom emerges as state based on its correlations with these other 
negative emotions. In Study 3, we explored how boredom differs from these other negative 
emotions based on correlations among individual differences in people’s tendencies to 
experience these emotions.  
Qualifying Boredom’s Distinctiveness 
After exploring and estimating the differences/similarities of boredom among other 
negative emotions, we sought to qualify these differences. Specifically, we examined in each 
study whether differences between the negative emotions were related to five appraisals that 
have been frequently associated with boredom in past research, including affective valence 
(i.e. pleasantness; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), arousal (Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993), 
perceived challenge (Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), perceived meaningfulness (Van Tilburg & 
Igou, 2012), and attention (Eastwood et al., 2012). 
Of the 11 emotions, no less than four (anger, disgust, guilt, shame) have been linked 
to moral judgments in previous research (Haidt, 2003). Although we are not aware of 
empirical research indicating a direct link between moral judgment and boredom, some 
scholars have proposed that boredom breeds morally reprehensible behavior (e.g., 
destructiveness, see Fromm, 1963/2004; monstrous essence, see Heidegger, in Thiele, 1997). 
Moreover, boredom correlates such as aggression and out-group derogation (Dahlen et al., 
2006; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011) might reflect some moral dimension to boredom. Thus, we 
also included a relevance to morality dimension (Van Tilburg et al., 2016) to account for the 
                                                          
1
 One may question if feeling depressed is an emotion. However, given that boredom is often 
implicated as correlate or precursor to depressive feelings in psychology (e.g., Erfani, 2004; 
Goldberg et al., 2011), we felt that is was valuable to nonetheless include it. 
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potential role that morality might play in characterizing the differences/similarities among the 
emotions. 
We used the appraisal evaluations of the emotions in two ways: First, we examined 
how boredom and the other emotions differed on them, thus gaining a descriptive profile of 
boredom versus the other emotions. Second, we tested how much variance the appraisals 
accounted for in characterizing the differences between the emotions when including versus 
excluding boredom. This second step helped to identify what boredom uniquely ‘brings to the 
table’ among the emotions. That is, by comparing the explanatory value of the appraisals for 
all emotions versus all emotion except boredom, we were able to identify the most 
informative appraisals for distinguishing boredom in particular. 
Method 
 The three studies followed a similar approach with each consisting of two parts: In a 
first part, we assessed the differences between boredom and 10 other negative experiences, 
namely, sadness, anger, frustration, fear, disgust, depression, guilt, shame, regret, and 
disappointment. These differences/similarities were examined at the level of emotion lay 
concepts (Study 1), state experiences (Study 2), or individual differences (Study 3). In the 
second part of each study, participants evaluated the emotions on six appraisal dimensions 
that may characterize the differences/similarities between the emotions obtained in the first 
part. Afterwards, participants reported demographic information and were debriefed. 
Emotion Differences/Similarities 
 Study 1. One hundred one participants (39 women, 62 men; Mage = 35.50, SDage = 
13.04) from the United States of America were recruited via MTurk (www.MTurk.com). 
They indicated the extent to which each pair of the 11 emotions were different/similar to each 
other (“How different or similar do you consider the following emotions to be?”; 1=very 
different, 10=very similar). The order of the resultant 55 comparisons was randomized. The 
data originating from these comparisons were organized in an 11 × 11 similarity matrix for 
each participant containing a similarity score for each of the emotion pairs. 
Study 2. In this study we sought to test to what extent state boredom can be 
differentiated from other emotions based on their correlations. For this purpose, 136 
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University of Southampton psychology undergraduates (109 women, 25 men, 2 undisclosed; 
Mage = 19.72, SDage = 1.72) were recruited for course credit. To ensure sufficient variation in 
these state experiences, we subjected participants to a context that was likely to elicit a range 
of emotions. They first watched an eight minute video clip
2
, after which they indicated their 
state experiences of the 11 emotions (e.g., “How intensely do you experience the following 
emotion, at this moment?”; 1 = not at all, 10 = extremely intensely). The order of these 11 
questions was randomized. 
We calculated the pair-wise correlations between each pair of emotions (Table 1) and 
used their absolute values as a proxy of difference/similarity between the emotions (Kruskal 
& Wish, 1978; Shepard, 1980). High correlations are analogous to a high level of similarity 
between two emotions, whereas low correlations are analogous to a high level of dissimilarity. 
Different from Study 1, in which each participant contributed an 11 × 11 similarity matrix, 
we thus obtained a single 11 × 11 similarity matrix in Study 2, containing absolute 
correlation coefficients. 
Study 3. Two hundred four participants (88 women, 113 men, 3 undeclared; Mage = 
36.39, SDage = 11.49) from the United States of America were recruited using MTurk. Each 
indicated the extent to which they tended to experience the 11 emotions as a person (“How 
often do you experience the following emotion as a person?”; 1 = not often at all, 10 = 
extremely often). The order of these 11 questions was randomized. A correlation matrix was 
created (Table 3) based on the pair-wise associations between the emotions. The absolute 
correlations served as 11 × 11 similarity matrix (Kruskal & Wish, 1978; Shepard, 1980) of 
individual differences in the proclivity to experience the emotions. 
                                                          
2
 The video clip consisted of a documentary except on Milgram’s (1963) famous behavioral 
study of obedience. We selected this clip because of the rich range of negative emotions it 
likely triggers (e.g., sadness, anger, disgust, etc.). Importantly, this clip had been shown on 
several occasions during the students’ psychology education, leading to experiences of 
boredom, as some students communicated. This capacity to elicit boredom as well as various 
other emotions thus made the clip an ideal for studying negative emotions at the state level. 
Indeed, this task sufficiently solicited boredom and the other emotions: descriptive statistics 
confirmed for each of the 11 emotions reasonable averages (each M ≥ 3.04 and M ≤ 5.15) 
with considerable standard deviations (all SD ≥ 2.14). 
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Appraisal Dimensions 
In the second part of each study, participants evaluated the 11 emotions on five 
appraisal dimensions derived from research on boredom: affective valence (i.e. pleasantness; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), arousal (Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993), perceived challenge 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), perceived meaningfulness (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012), and 
attention (Eastwood et al., 2012). Given that some of the emotions have been linked to moral 
judgments in earlier research and that boredom might affect moral judgment, we deemed it 
informative to also compare the emotions on relevance to morality (Van Tilburg et al., 2016), 
bringing the amount of evaluated appraisals to a total of six.  
Before participants evaluated the emotions on each of the six appraisals, we gave 
them short descriptions of the appraisal constructs. This was done to facilitate participants’ 
understanding of the particular appraisals. Participants read “Some emotions are associated 
with negative feelings whereas other emotions are associated with positive feelings” before 
evaluating the emotions’ affective valence. They then read “Some emotions are associated 
with high levels of arousal (i.e., these emotions are very intense and make one feel alert) 
whereas other emotions are associated with low levels of arousal” before evaluating the 
emotions’ arousal. Participants read “Some emotions are associated with feeling that you are 
doing something unchallenging whereas other emotions are associated with feeling that you 
are doing something challenging” before evaluating challenge. They read “Some emotions 
are associated with high levels of attention for what is going on whereas other emotions are 
associated with low levels of attention for what is going on” before evaluating attention. 
Participants read “Some emotions are associated with feeling that you are doing something 
meaningless whereas other emotions are associated with feeling that you are doing something 
meaningful” before evaluating meaning. They read “Some emotions are associated with 
morality (i.e., these emotions relate to the question of what makes a good or bad person) 
whereas other emotions are not associated with morality” prior to evaluating the emotions’ 
relevance to morality (Van Tilburg et al., 2016).  
After these descriptions, they then evaluated the emotions (e.g., for valence: “Please 
rate the positivity or negativity of the emotions listed below.” 1 = extremely negative, 10 = 
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extremely positive). The order of the 11 emotions was randomized for each dimension; also 
the order of the evaluated appraisals was randomized. 
Results and Discussion 
Emotion Similarities/Differences 
In Study 1, the comparison of emotions produced several similarity matrices. Study 2 
and 3 each produced one similarity matrix. In Study 1, the matrixes consisted of explicit 
comparisons between emotions. In Study 2 and 3, the matrixes consisted of correlations 
between the emotions, with higher correlations reflecting greater similarity (e.g., Shepard, 
1980). We subjected the matrices to interval-level multidimensional scaling analyses 
(Kruskal & Wish, 1978). A repeated structure was specified for the analysis of Study 1 given 
that each participant provided a separate similarity matrix.  
Multidimensional scaling produces a spatial model of differences between variables 
using 1 or more dimensions, and the modeled distance between two variables within the 
resultant dimensional space is analogous to the estimated difference between the variables. 
The Stress associated with the models indicates how well a particular dimensional 
representation fits the observed data. Stress increases with fewer dimensions at the cost of 
model comprehensibility; Stress below .15 reflects adequate fit and turns into an excellent fit 
when below .10 (Kruskal and Wish, 1978; Jaworska & Chupetlovska-Anastasova, 2009). For 
each Study, a two-dimensional representation yielded sufficiently low Stress (Stress = 
0.104, .014, and .035, respectively). These models are represented in Figure 1 through 3. We 
next performed 200 bootstraps to estimate the emotions’ 95% confidence regions (Jacoby & 
Armstrong, 2014) as well as the confidence regions of the differences between boredom and 
each of the other emotions.
3
 
                                                          
3
 For Study 1, each bootstrap contained 101 randomly selected similarity matrixes. For Study 
2 and 3, each bootstrap contained an absolute correlation matrix based on 136 (Study 2) and 
204 (Study 3) randomly selected participants. To obtain confidence regions, we followed 
Jacoby and Armstrong (2014): each of the bootstrapped matrixes were/was subjected to a 
multidimensional scaling analysis followed by Procrustean similarity transformations 
(Schöneman & Caroll, 1970). 95% confidence ellipsoids were drawn using the eigenvalues of 
the emotions’ variance/covariance matrix containing these 200 transformed coordinates. To 
test whether boredom significantly differed from the other emotions we additionally 
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The multidimensional scaling analyses consistently placed boredom at a significant 
distance from each of the other emotions (all p < .05, in every study). Moreover, the models 
were surprisingly consistent in their results for boredom across the three levels of analyses. 
Across the three Studies, boredom was each time located the furthest away from the origin 
(0,0) of all 11 emotions. In case of the state emotions (Study 2) boredom even yielded a 
distance to the origin that was more than twice that of the next most distant emotion (regret). 
This pattern clearly indicates that boredom is comparatively distinct, whether examined as 
concept, state, or individual difference.
4
 
The concept of boredom (Study 1) was considered to be least different from sadness, 
frustration, and feeling depressed, whereas disgust, anger, shame, guilt regret, and fear were 
considerably more different. This pattern of results was largely consistent with boredom’s 
differentiation at the level of individual differences (Study 3), which similarly cast boredom 
as relatively less dissimilar to sadness, frustration, and feeling depressed, and further included 
disappointment as least dissimilar emotion. Results were somewhat different for state 
boredom (Study 2), where boredom differed extensively from all other emotions, being least 
different to feeling depressed, though far from similar.
5
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
estimated 95% confidence regions based on the difference in coordinates between boredom 
and the other emotions. None of these latter ellipsoids contained the coordinate (0,0). 
4
 Note that the emotion similarities/differences (Study 1: lay comparisons, Study 2-3: 
correlations) are the basis for the derived spatial models and not the appraisals. Appraisals 
were rated after we assessed the emotions similarities/differences and in the analyses they 
were fitted to the models after the emotion coordinates were already determined. Thus, 
participants’ ratings of the emotions on the appraisals did not determine the emotions’ spatial 
coordinates; rather, the emotions’ coordinates were based on the similarity matrices.  
5
 To verify that results of Study 2 were not limited to the specific state boredom context, we 
also analyzed pilot data from 84 MTurk participants (41 women, 33 men, 10 undeclared; Mage 
= 37.16, SD = 12.91) from the United States of America. These participants performed either 
one of two boring tasks: Some (N = 30) connected pairs of circles within 15 groups of 4-7 
circles using non-intersecting lines (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011); others (N = 54) transcribed 
10 references to literature about concrete (e.g., “S. H. Kosmatka &W. C. Panarese, 1988, 
Design and Control of Concrete Mixtures, Skokie, IL: Portland Cement Association”; Van 
Tilburg et al., 2013). As those in the main sample, they then indicated their state experiences, 
in random order, of the 11 emotions. The results again located boredom on the far right side 
of the primary (horizontal) axis, significantly distinct from all the other emotions. Details are 
available on request. 
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Boredom differed comparatively much from the other emotions at each level of 
analysis (concept, state, individual difference). Intriguingly, these differences were 
particularly strong for state boredom. Indeed, state boredom did not significantly correlate 
with any of the 11 other emotions (Table 1), whereas boredom positively correlated with all 
other emotions when examined as individual difference (Table 2). This finding suggests that 
the study of boredom at the state level—an approach that has recently intensified (Fahlman et 
al., 2013; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012)—is particularly effective in order to understand its 
unique characteristics. 
Appraisal Dimensions 
Specific appraisal differences. Thus far, we discussed only the relative spatial 
positioning of boredom among the 11 negative emotions. Next, we sought to identify what 
underlies these differences, based on the appraisal dimensions that participants evaluated. To 
this end, we subjected participants’ ratings of each of the appraisals to within-subjects 
ANOVAs with the evaluated emotion as within-subjects factor.  
In each of the three studies the emotions varied significantly and substantially from 
each other on affective valence (all p < .001, all η
2
 ≥ .14), arousal (all p < .001, all η
2
 ≥ .41), 
relevance to morality (all p < .001, all η
2
 ≥ .38), perceived challenge (all p < .001, all η
2
 
≥ .32), perceived meaningfulness (all p < .001, all η
2
 ≥ .15), and attention (all p < .001, all η
2
 
≥ .33). Furthermore, in each of the studies boredom was rated as significantly higher than 
each single other emotions on affective valence (all p < .001, all η
2
 ≥ .14), and significantly 
lower on arousal (all p ≤ .004, all η
2
 ≥ .08), relevance to morality (all p < .001, all η
2
 ≥ .12), 
perceived challenge (all p < .001, all η
2
 ≥ .14), perceived meaningfulness (all p < .001, all η
2
 
≥ .16), and attention (all p < .001, all η
2
 ≥ .16).6 These results clearly indicate that boredom 
can be differentiated from other emotions on the assessed appraisals. Overall, boredom was 
consistently characterized by relatively mild negative valence
7
, combined with low arousal, 
                                                          
6
 Further descriptive and inferential statistics are available on request. 
7
 Relatively mild negative valence is a more appropriate label than positive valence given that 
boredom received valence ratings that were below the scale midpoint. The other emotions 
scored even more negative. 
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low perceived challenge, low perceived meaningfulness, little attention, and little relevance to 
morality. 
Distinguishing emotions via appraisal models. Above we examined the extent of 
the appraisal differences, not their utility for distinguishing the various emotions. For 
example, it could be that even though the emotions differ in the extent to which they are 
relevant to moral judgment and behavior, this ‘morality’ dimension may prove to be of 
relatively low importance for characterizing the overall differences between the emotions 
compared to, say, valence. Accordingly, we examined the utility of the appraisals for 
differentiations between the emotions by considering the two-dimensional models. Separately 
for each study and each appraisal, the appraisal ratings were regressed on the emotions’ 
dimensional coordinates in the multidimensional scaling models. The resultant standardized 
regression coefficients yield coordinates that define a vector starting at the models’ origins 
(Rusbult et al., 1993). The orientations of these appraisal vectors, superimposed in Figure 1, 2 
and 3, reflect the angle at which these appraisals run through the two-dimensional space, 
whereas their lengths indicate how well they fit into the two-dimensional models (equivalent 
to the roots of their total explained variances). For example, affective valence roughly 
followed the horizontal axes, indicating that valence is more positive (or less negative) the 
more emotions are positioned to the left of the models. Arousal, on the other hand, roughly 
pointed towards the top-left corner in Figure 1 and 3. To clarify, this implies that the 
emotions above the diagonal originating at the bottom-left are relatively high in arousal, 
whereas those below the diagonal are relatively low in arousal. The orientations of the 
various appraisal vectors were strikingly similar across Study 1 and 3, describing differences 
in emotion concepts and individual differences respectively. The vectors in Study 2 were 
more or less the horizontally mirrored equivalents of those in Study 1 and 3. 
The explained variances associated with the regressed appraisals are provided in 
Table 3 (“Total R2”). These explained variances indicate how well a given appraisal 
corresponds to the differences/similarities between the emotions in the models. Whereas the 
earlier analyses tested whether the emotions differed on the appraisals, the explained 
variances in Table 3 thus indicate how useful the appraisals are in characterizing the 
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differences/similarities among the emotions. Each of the appraisal vectors explained the 
relative differences between the emotions to a considerable degree (all R
2
 ≥ .24).  
In terms of lay concepts (Study 1), the emotions were particularly distinctive in terms 
of arousal, relevance to morality, and attention. Affective valence, perceived challenge, and 
perceived meaningfulness described the emotions’ differences to a lesser extent. A somewhat 
similar picture emerged in relation to the emotions’ dissimilarities/similarities in terms of 
individual differences (Study 3): arousal and attention corresponded well to the distances 
among the emotion, though relevance to morality did so to a lesser extent, followed by 
perceived meaningfulness, perceived challenge, and affective valence. For state emotions 
(Study 2), attention again corresponded well to the differences/similarities. However, here 
perceive meaningfulness emerged as particularly well-fitting appraisal. The other four 
appraisals, valence, perceived challenge, relevance to morality, and arousal, characterized 
the differences/similarities among emotion states to a lesser degree. 
Distinguishing boredom. In the previous section we discussed the utility of the 
appraisals to characterize the two-dimensional models in general. Next, we tested which 
appraisals were useful for distinguishing boredom in particular. For that purpose, we again 
regressed the appraisals on the dimension coordinates of the emotions, but now excluding 
boredom. The subsequent change in explained variance then becomes a proxy for usefulness 
of a particular appraisal in differentiating boredom from the remaining emotions. The results 
of these analyses are reported in Table 3 (“R2 Without Boredom” and “R2 Difference”). 
Consistent with the prior analyses, boredom could be differentiated from the other 
emotions most easily as state, reflected in relatively high changes in explained variances 
across the appraisals in the corresponding Study 2. Strikingly, one appraisal was consistently 
the most useful, or second most useful in case of the concept comparisons, for distinguishing 
boredom from the other emotions: perceived meaningfulness. Across the models, the 
explained variance of perceived meaningfulness dropped considerably (relative to the 
differences in explained variances associated with the other appraisals) after excluding 
boredom. Besides perceived meaningfulness, also attention emerged as key appraisal that 
distinguished boredom from the other emotions, with the exception of the concept 
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differences/similarities in Study 1. Arousal, relevance to morality, and perceived challenge 
emerged as less important distinguishing features of boredom, at least in comparison to the 
other appraisals. Affective valence evidenced high utility in distinguishing boredom from the 
other emotions as concept, but less so at the level of state or individual difference. In all, 
these results indicate that in particular a perceived lack of meaningfulness and lack of 
attention set boredom apart from other negative emotions. 
General Discussion 
We systematically examined whether boredom can be sufficiently differentiated from 
other negative emotions at the level of lay emotion concepts (Study 1), state experiences 
(Study 2), and individual differences (Study 3). We first examined the relative 
differences/similarities among 11 negative emotions, including boredom, and then examined 
how well six appraisals corresponded to these differences/similarities. Results consistently 
indicated that the concept of boredom as well as boredom experiences differ comparatively 
much from other negative emotions, more so than the other emotions tend to differ from each 
other. In terms of appraisals, boredom was evaluated as mild in negative affective valence, 
relatively low in arousal, with little relevance to morality, associated with low perceived 
challenge, low perceived meaningfulness, and low attention. 
A considerable amount of literature has focused on boredom’s existential 
connotations (e.g., Barbalet, 1999; Fahlman, et al., 2009; Van Tilburg et al., 2013). Our 
present results confirm that boredom involves low perceived meaningfulness. This existential 
feature of boredom is, moreover, highly useful to distinguish boredom from other negative 
emotions as concept, state, or individual difference. Especially on the basis of this feature, 
boredom differs from other negative emotions. 
Attention emerged as appraisal that could consistently characterize the 
differences/similarities among the negative emotions across the three levels of analysis, each 
time boasting considerably high explained variance (65% and above). Eastwood and 
colleagues (2012) proposed that attention related processes are fundamental to understating 
what boredom is and what it does. Our findings corroborate this view from the perspective 
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that attention differentiated boredom considerably from other negative emotions, at least as 
state and individual difference. 
Among all negative emotions, boredom was characterized by the least negative 
affective valence. Relative to other negative emotions boredom is only mildly unpleasant. 
This finding is broadly consistent with findings by Smith and Ellsworth (1985). Different 
from these researchers’ findings, however, boredom’s valence was not similar to that of 
disgust. It should be noted that although affective valence characterized the 
differences/similarities among the emotions in our three studies to a moderate degree, it did 
so much less than most of the other appraisals. Furthermore, affective valence was relatively 
ineffective for distinguishing boredom in particular from the other emotions, safe in terms of 
conceptual comparisons. This suggests that differentiating boredom from other emotions 
based on valence appraisals is not particularly fruitful. 
The role of arousal in boredom has been much debated. Some researchers have 
argued that boredom is characterized by low arousal (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; 
Vodanovich, 2003), whereas others suggested that boredom could be high in arousal (London, 
Schubert, & Washburn, 1972), that some but not all expressions of boredom involve high 
arousal (Goetz et al., 2014), or that boredom is mixed in arousal (Merrifield & Danckert, 
2014). Our findings are consistent with the suggestion that boredom is characterized by low 
arousal. Relative to 10 other emotions, boredom consistently yielded least arousal. However, 
although arousal was useful for characterizing the differences among all 11 negative 
emotions, arousal was of relatively little utility for distinguishing boredom in particular. 
Specifically, other appraisals (perceived meaningfulness, attention) were more effective.  
Our results further indicate that people consider boredom to be relatively unrelated to 
moral judgments and behaviors, at least significantly less than each of the other emotions. 
Likewise, boredom scored significantly lower than all other emotions in perceived challenge. 
However, relevance to morality and perceived challenge did not emerge as the most useful 
dimension to differentiate boredom. The results indicate that these features of boredom are 
only moderately instrumental for differencing boredom from other negative emotions. 
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Implications, Limitations, and Future Directions 
Overall, we chose a broad, integrative approach to examine differences between 
boredom and other negative emotions. Specifically, we considered lay perceptions of 
boredom as well as actual experiences of boredom by measuring both perceived differences 
and experienced emotions. After representing how similar or different the emotions were on 
the basis of people’s perceptions (Study 1) and in terms of their concurrence in experience 
(Study 2 & 3), we then examined that perceived appraisals corresponded to these differences 
between emotions. We posed that boredom is an emotion that differs considerably from other 
emotions. The results of our studies support this notion: boredom was perceived as more 
dissimilar to other negative emotions than any other pair of negative emotions (Study 1). 
Likewise, the state experience of boredom (Study 2) or individual proclivity to experience 
boredom (Study 3) coincided comparatively little with other negative emotions. 
We found striking consistency in the dissimilarity/similarity models, despite the three 
different levels of analysis we employed. Boredom was each time characterized by mild 
negative valence, low arousal, low perceived meaningfulness and challenge, and little 
relevance to morality. Whereas the different levels of analysis led some of the other negative 
emotions to take different positions in the models (e.g., fear, anger), boredom’s location 
remained almost identical. This consistency suggests that while other negative emotions 
become more or less similar depending on whether examined as concept, state, or individual 
difference, boredom remains highly distinct regardless of its level of analysis. 
Our findings take boredom back to early reflections on its nature and impact (e.g., 
Fromm, 1955; Martin et al., 2005; Thiele, 1997): boredom is an existential emotion that is 
characterized and differentiated based on the lack of perceived meaning that it entails. The 
finding that boredom involves a lack of perceived meaning is consistent with earlier 
theorizing (Barbalet, 1999) and empirical findings (e.g., Fahlman et al., 2009; Van Tilburg & 
Igou, 2011; Van Tilburg et al., 2013); our current work demonstrates that it is this existential 
element makes it also most distinct from negative emotions. Perhaps the uniqueness of the 
existential challenges signaled by boredom illuminates its social or evolutionary role. 
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Speculatively, the lack of purpose that boredom registers developed to regulate goal-pursuit, 
for example, by temporarily increasing people’s sensitivity to the value of alternative goals.  
Eastwood and colleagues (2012) argued that a lack of attention is the defining 
characteristic of boredom. In particular, these researchers articulated that boredom involves 
being aware of the inability “to successfully engage attention with internal (e.g., thoughts or 
feelings) or external (e.g., environmental stimuli) information required for participating in 
satisfying activity” (p. 484). People subsequently blame the (social) environment for their 
boredom. Our findings corroborate the proposed key role of attention and further show that a 
lack of attention distinguishes boredom from other negative emotions. Perhaps, boredom’s 
lack of attention indicates that attention shifts elsewhere, for example directed towards 
identifying more meaningful courses of action (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). 
Boring activities can lead to mind-wandering (Kane et al., 2007), or “stimulus-
independent thought” (Killingsworth & Gillbert, 2010), due to a lack of engaging task-
features that should sustain a person’s attention (Eastwood et al., 2012). To be clear, although 
boredom may often lead to mind-wandering, a wandering mind may not necessarily feel 
bored, for example when people daydream (Schupak & Rosenthal, 2009). Although mind-
wandering can prove detrimental to performance (see Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013), it can 
also foster inspiration and creativity (Baird, Smallwood, Mrazek, Kam, Franklin, & Schooler, 
2012). In fact, Mooneyham and Schooler (2013) proposed that mind-wandering may serve a 
range of functions, including attention shifts to maintain goal-relevant behavior, brief 
moments of dishabituation to increase benefits from learning, or, indeed, relief from boredom.  
Our finding that boredom is strongly characterized by a lack of attention and a lack of 
meaning may shed some light on the link between mind-wandering and boredom. We (Van 
Tilburg & Igou, 2011, 2016, in press) and others (Barbelet, 1999; Bench & Lench, 2013; 
Elpidorou, 2014) suggested that boredom’s psychological functionality may be to steer 
people away from little rewarding (purposeless) activity towards more rewarding activity that 
facilitates (perceived) pursuit of high-value goals. Subjectively, behaviors that are perceived 
as instrumental in the pursuit of high-value goals are meaningful (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2013). 
Perhaps, mind-wandering in response to boredom fulfills exactly this role. Consistent with 
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Mooneyham and Schooler (2013), mind-wandering may offer bored people a tool for shifting 
attention towards potentially more valuable goals and their corresponding behaviors, 
facilitation self-regulation and mitigating boredom through the perceived meaning that such 
activity offers. Interestingly, some tentative support for this proposition was obtained in 
experimental and correlational work on nostalgia, a sentimental longing for the past 
(Wildschut, Sedikides, Arndt, & Routledge, 2006) and an antidote to boredom (Van Tilburg 
et al., 2013). These researchers found that bored people who were allowed to reflect freely on 
their past spontaneously engaged in nostalgic reverie. This impact of boredom was mediated 
by bored people’s increased desire to engage in meaningful activity. Nostalgia, indeed, 
offered people a sense of meaning, potentially alleviating boredom (see also Sedikides, 
Wildschut, Arndt, & Routledge, 2008). Possibly, nostalgia here reflects a special case of 
more general mind-wandering strategies that people adopt in response to boredom. 
The mind-wandering literature makes the distinction between spontaneous versus 
deliberate mind-wandering (Seli et al., 2014). Our measure of attention was not designed to 
distinguish between the two types of mind-wandering. It would be interesting for future 
research to further divide attention into two corresponding forms: intentional (in)attention 
versus unintentional (in)attention. Doing so may grant a deeper understanding of the type of 
mind-wandering with which boredom may be associated.  
Given that boredom is different from the other negative emotions, one might raise the 
question whether boredom is in fact an emotion. The existing evidence indicates that it is. 
Emotions can be described from a componential perspective where many components (and 
sometimes all of them) are present across different emotions (e.g., Scherer, 1984), which is  
what Frijda (1988) referred to as a constitution of emotions that contains various ‘laws.’ 
Particularly noteworthy prototypical components include (a) a relatively coherent set of 
cognitive appraisals (Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990), (b) a bodily/physiological component 
(Wallbott, 1998), (c) relevance to motivational processes (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994), 
and (d) an identifiable cause (Beedie, Terry, & Lane, 2005). Boredom satisfies each of these 
features: (a: Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; b: Merrifield & Danckert, 2014, Wallbott, 1998; c: 
Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012; d: Van Tilburg et al., 2013). Consistently, several emotion experts 
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have treated (state) boredom as an emotion (e.g., Leary et al., 1986; Russell & Bullock, 1985; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). 
In the current research we examined boredom’s differentiation from other negative 
emotions based on lay concept comparisons, correlations amongst states, and correlations 
amongst individual differences. We did not examine whether boredom can similarly be 
differentiated in terms of its antecedents or implications. Future research will do well to 
examine differentiations at the level of emotions’ causes and consequences. For example, 
boredom may foster more meaning seeking behavior relative to disgust and anger, two 
emotions that consistently scored high on perceived meaning. Likewise, guilt and shame, two 
emotions highly relevant to morality may have a more pronounced impact on ethical decision 
making than boredom (see also Haidt, 2003).  
We assessed the differences/similarities of boredom among negative emotions using 
single item assessment. We decided to use highly face valid single items that were consistent 
in phrasing to prevent potential method bias resulting from the use of a differently phrased 
emotion-specific measures. Although the use of single items can, though need not, reduce 
measurement validity, the relatively good fit and consistency of our models suggests that the 
single items measurement unlikely distorted our results. Indeed, individual differences 
research on boredom and anger, sadness, and feeling depressed (e.g., Dahlen et al., 2011; 
Vodanovich et al., 1991) yielded correlations with boredom that are comparable to those in 
the current research (Study 3). 
In particular the findings that perceived challenge and arousal hold limited utility for 
differentiating boredom from the other negative emotions is striking: Prior research has 
focused much on these two or closely related aspects of boredom (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012; Vodanovich, 2003), typically emphasizing how these 
elements make boredom different from other states. To be clear, boredom does differ from 
the other emotions in terms of arousal and perceived challenge. Importantly, however, these 
aspects of boredom are not particularly helpful in distinguishing it from the other emotions. 
These results further emphasize the importance of differentiating boredom among other 
emotions without pre-imposing a set of dimensions on which this differentiation has to occur. 
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Specifically, arousal and perceived (lack of) challenge seem important distinguishing features 
of boredom as evident from significant differences on these dimensions compared to other 
emotions (e.g., Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). Yet, when boredom is compared to other 
emotions without specifying what set of criteria people have to use in these comparisons, as 
we did currently, then other, more diagnostic appraisals surface (i.e. perceived meaning and 
attention). 
Our findings indicate that people consider boredom to be a low arousal state. That is 
to say, participants evaluated arousal to be least intense for boredom compared to the other 
emotions. It may well be that the role of arousal within boredom is particularly complex, 
however. Research by Goetz and colleagues (2014) suggests that boredom sometimes 
involves comparatively high arousal. Further, Merrifield and Danckert (2014) found 
indications of both high and low arousal among bored individuals: relatively to controls, 
boredom increased heart rate and cortisol levels (both markers of high arousal) but decreased 
skin conductance (reflecting of low arousal). In addition, individual differences in boredom 
seem related to both behavioral approach motivations and inhibition motivations (see: 
Mercer-Lynn, Bar, & Eastwood, 2014). Might it be possible that boredom features both high 
and low arousal? Perhaps, over time (e.g., Goetz & Frenzel, 2006) state boredom develops 
from a low arousal state associated with assessment of the current situation (e.g., perceived 
lack of meaning, lack of challenge, and little attention), to a comparatively high arousal state 
characterized by a search for meaningful engagement, more challenge, and more stimulation 
(Eastwood et al., 2012; Merrifield & Danckert, 2013; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). This 
possibility is consistent with Inzlicht and Legault’s (2014) notion that distress in the face of 
conflicting goals is a key feature of emotion induced motivation (see also Carver & Scheier, 
2011). Clearly, the role of arousal within boredom remains an important direction for future 
study. 
After we estimated the spatial models of the negative emotions in our research, we 
examined how the emotions’ spatial positions corresponded to six appraisals. We selected 
these appraisals—valence, arousal, challenge, attention, meaning, and relevance to 
morality—based on earlier work on boredom that suggested their importance. Of course, 
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there may be other appraisals that can prove insightful in characterizing the differences 
between boredom and the other emotions, such as restlessness, irritability or apathy (e.g., 
Goetz et al., 2014; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). Although assessing different appraisals would 
not change the spatial coordinates of the emotions in our models, they could reveal other 
important differences among the emotions. Future research should examine complementary 
appraisals and test if lack of attention and perceived meaninglessness remain comparatively 
powerful in characterizing boredom’s differences with other emotions. Likewise, it is 
worthwhile to test if the differences between boredom the other emotions can be 
characterized by other emotion features than appraisals, such as differences in facial 
expressions and physiology. 
Our samples varied somewhat in gender ratio. Might this have affected our results? 
Average levels of boredom are usually higher for men than for women (e.g., Vodanovich & 
Kass, 1990), however, our analyses were not based on average levels of boredom but rather 
on boredom’s perceived similarity to (Study 1), or correlations with (Study 2-3), other 
emotions. Future research should examine whether relevant individual differences, such as 
emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), self-awareness (Moynihan et al., 2015), and 
gender, relate to the relative positioning of boredom amongst the other negative emotions. 
In the present studies, we focused on negative emotions. As boredom is usually 
characterized as an unpleasant emotion (Eastwood et al., 2012; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012; 
Vodanovich, 2003), we deemed it particularly worthwhile to include negative emotions as 
benchmarks for establishing boredom’s distinctiveness. Nonetheless, it would be interesting 
for future research to examine also boredoms position relative to positive emotions. Such 
research could examine whether states such as curiosity, nostalgia, passion, or awe—each 
perhaps associated focused attention and finding meaning (e.g., Van Tilburg, Sedikides, & 
Wildschut, 2015)—emerge as spatial ‘antagonists’ of boredom. 
In all, our research suggests that across different levels of analysis, lack of perceived 
meaning and low levels of attention contribute greatly to a differentiation of boredom in 
comparison to a range of negative emotions. Using multidimensional scaling, we could 
confirm earlier findings on characteristics of boredom, in particular that research of Eastwood 
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and colleagues (2012) and Van Tilburg & Igou (2011, 2012; Van Tilburg, Igou, & Sedikides, 
2013). Arousal (Vodanovich, 2003), valence (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) perceived 
challenge (e.g., Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011) and relevance to moral judgments and behavior  
(Van Tilburg et al., 2015) are comparably less helpful in distinguishing boredom from other 
negative emotions. Clarifying this relative distinctiveness of boredom amongst negative 
emotions, and identifying sources of this distinctiveness, is not only essential for developing 
theoretical understandings of boredom, but also provides opportunities for identifying and 
subsequently addressing undesirable behaviors stemming from boredom. 
Conclusion 
Boredom and its consequences receive increasing attention in psychological science. 
Unfortunately, boredom remained relatively poorly understood and its operationalizations 
varied greatly. At the heart of this ambiguity lies the question whether boredom can be 
reasonably distinguished from other negative emotions, and if so, how. We tested boredom’s 
distinctiveness relative to other negative emotions at the level of lay concepts (Study 1), state 
experiences (Study 2), and individual differences (Study 3). Our multidimensional scaling 
analyses consistently indicated that boredom is considerably different from other negative 
emotions. Furthermore, appraisal evaluations reflect that boredom boasts relatively mild 
negative valence, low arousal, low relevance to morality, low perceived challenge, low 
perceived meaning, and low attention. In particular the lack of meaningfulness and attention 
effectively differentiate boredom from other negative emotions. 
These results lead to two key recommendations for researchers who investigate 
boredom, or who plan to join its increasingly popular study. First, we offer a reassurance: 
boredom is considerably distinct from other negative emotions and its specific scientific 
study is therefore deserving. Second, we set a challenge: because boredom is quite distinct, 
we urge boredom researchers—which include ourselves—to more carefully prevent 
confounding or confusing boredom with other emotions in future experimental induction, 
psychometric assessment, or conceptual discussion. We understand our research as 
constructive criticism of prior research, including our own work, to further advance and 
improve the validity of boredom research. 
DIFFERENTIATING BOREDOM  27 
 
References 
Barbalet, J. M. (1999). Boredom and social meaning. British Journal of Sociology, 50, 631-
646. doi:10.1111/j.1468-4446.1999.00631.x 
Blaszczynski, A., McConaghy, N., & Frankova, A. (1990). Boredom proneness in 
pathological gambling. Psychological Reports, 67, 35-42. 
doi:10.2466/pr0.1990.67.1.35 
Baird, B., Smallwood, J., Mrazek, M. D., Kam, J. W., Franklin, M. S., & Schooler, J. W. 
(2012). Inspired by distraction : Mind wandering facilitates creative incubation. 
Psychological Science, 23, 1117-1122. doi:10.1177/0956797612446024 
Beedie, C., Terry, P., & Lane, A. (2005). Distinctions between emotion and mood. Cognition 
& Emotion, 19, 847-878. doi:10.1080/02699930541000057 
Bench, S. W., & Lench, H. C. (2013). On the function of boredom. Behavioral Sciences, 3, 
459-472. doi:10.3390/bs3030459 
Buss, A. H., & Perry, M. (1992). The Aggression Questionnaire. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 63, 452-459. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.3.452 
Carver C. S., Scheier M. F. (2011). Self-regulation of action and affect. In Vohs K. D., 
Baumeister R. F. (Eds.), Handbook of Self-Regulation (pp. 3–21). New York, NY: 
Guilford. 
Craeynest, M., Crombez, G., Koster, H.W.E., Haerens, L., & De Bourdeaudhuij. (2008). 
Cognitive-motivational determinants of fat food consumption in overweight and 
obese youngsters: The implicit association between fat food and arousal. Journal of 
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 39, 354-368. 
doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2007.09.002 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Beyond boredom and anxiety: Experiencing flow in work and 
play. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Dahlen, E. R., Martin, R. C., Ragan, K., & Kuhlman, M. M. (2004). Boredom proneness in 
anger and aggression: Effects of impulsiveness and sensation seeking. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 37, 1615-1627. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2004.02.016 
DIFFERENTIATING BOREDOM  28 
 
Eastwood, J. D., Frischen, A., Fenske, M. J., & Smilek, D. (2012). The unengaged mind 
defining boredom in terms of attention. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 
482-495. doi:10.1177/1745691612456044 
Elpidorou, A. (2014). The bright side of boredom. Frontiers in Psychology, 5:1245. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01245 
Erfani, F. (2004). Sartre and Kierkegaard on the aesthetics of boredom. Idealistic Studies, 34, 
303-317. doi:10.5840/idstudies200434312 
Fahlman, S. A., Mercer, K. B., Gaskocski, P., Eastwood, A. E., & Eastwood, J. D. (2009). 
Does a lack of life meaning cause boredom? Results from psychometric, longitudinal, 
and experimental analyses. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 28, 307-340. 
doi:10.1521/jscp.2009.28.3.307 
Fahlman, S. A., Mercer-Lynn, K. B, Flora, D. B., & Eastwood, J. D. (2013). Development 
and validation of the multidimensional state boredom scale. Assessment, 20, 68-85. 
doi:10.1177/1073191111421303 
Fehr, B., & Russell, J. A. (1984). Concept of emotion viewed from a prototype perspective. 
Journal of experimental psychology: General, 113, 464-486. doi:10.1037/0096-
3445.113.3.464 
Farmer, R., & Sundberg, N. D. (1986). Boredom proneness – The development and correlates 
of a new scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 50, 4-17. 
doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa5001_2 
Frijda, N. H. (2007). The laws of emotion. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 
Fromm, E. (1955). The sane society. New York. NY: Rinehart. 
Fromm, E. (1963). The dogma of Christ and other essays. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston. 
Fromm, E. (1972). The anatomy of human destructiveness. New York, NY: Holt McDougal. 
Fromm, E. (1991). Die Pathologie der Normalität. Weinheim, Germany: Beltz Verlag. 
Geiwitz, P. J. (1966). Structure of boredom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3, 
592-600. doi:10.1037/h0023202 
DIFFERENTIATING BOREDOM  29 
 
Götz, T., & Frenzel, A. C. (2006). Phänomenologie schulischer Langeweile. Zeitschrift für 
Entwicklungspsychologie und Pädagogische Psychologie, 38, 149-153. 
doi:10.1026/0049-8637.38.4.149 
Goetz, T., Frenzel, A. C., Hall, N. C., Nett, U. E., Pekrun, R., & Lipnevich, A. A. (2014). 
Types of boredom: An experience sampling approach. Motivation and Emotion, 38, 
401-419. doi:10.1007/s11031-013-9385-y 
Goldberg, Y. K., Eastwood, J. D., LaGuardia, J., & Danckert, J. (2011). Boredom: An 
emotional experience distinct from apathy, anhedonia, or depression. Journal of 
Social and Clinical Psychology, 30, 647-666. doi:10.1521/jscp.2011.30.6.647 
Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith 
(Eds.), Handbook of affective sciences (pp. 852-870). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Harlé, K. M., & Sanfey, A. G. (2010). Effects of approach and withdrawal motivation on 
interactive economic decisions. Cognition and Emotion, 24, 1456-1465. 
doi:10.1080/02699930903510220 
Heine, S. J., Proulx, T., & Vohs, K. D. (2006). The meaning maintenance model: On the 
coherence of social motivations. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 88-
110. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1002_1 
Hepper, E. G., Ritchie, T. D., Sedikides, C., & Wildschut, T. (2012). Odyssey's end: lay 
conceptions of nostalgia reflect its original Homeric meaning. Emotion, 12, 102-119. 
doi:10.1037/a0025167 
Inzlicht M., & Legault L. (2014). No pain, no gain: How distress underlies effective self-
control (and unites diverse social psychological phenomena). In Forgas J., Harmon-
Jones E. (Eds.), The control within: Motivation and its regulation. New York, NY: 
Psychology Press. 
Jacoby, W. G., & Armstrong, D. A. (2014). Bootstrap Confidence Regions for 
Multidimensional Scaling Solutions. American Journal of Political Science, 58, 264-
278. doi:10.1111/ajps.12056 
DIFFERENTIATING BOREDOM  30 
 
Jaworska, N., & Chupetlovska-Anastasova, A. (2009). A review of multidimensional scaling 
(MDS) and its utility in various psychological domains. Tutorials in Quantitative 
Methods for Psychology, 5, 1-10. 
Kane, M. J., Brown, L. H., McVay, J. C., Silvia, P. J., Myin-Germeys, I., & Kwapil, T. R. 
(2007). For whom the mind wanders, and when an experience-sampling study of 
working memory and executive control in daily life. Psychological Science, 18, 614-
621. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01948.x 
Kass, S. J., Vodanovich, S. J., & Callander, A. (2001). State-trait boredom: The relationship 
to absenteeism, tenure and job satisfaction. Journal of Business and Psychology, 16, 
317-327. doi:10.1023/A:1011121503118 
Killingsworth, M. A., & Gilbert, D. T. (2010). A wandering mind is an unhappy mind. 
Science, 330(6006), 932-932. doi:10.1126/science.1192439 
Koball, A. M., Meers, M. R., Storfer-Isser, A., Domoff, S. E., & Musher-Eizenman, D. R. 
(2012). Eating when bored: Revision of the Emotional Eating Scale with a focus on 
boredom. Health Psychology, 31, 521-524. doi:10.1037/a0025893 
Kruskal, J. B., & Wish, M. (1978). Multidimensional scaling. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Larson, R. W., & Richards, M. H. (1991). Boredom in the middle school years: Blaming 
schools versus blaming students. American Journal of Education, 99, 418-443. 
Leary, M. R., Rogers, P. A., Canfield, R. W., & Coe, C. (1986). Boredom in interpersonal 
encounters: Antecedents and social implications. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 51, 968-975. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.5.968 
Leong, F. T., & Schneller, G. R. (1993). Boredom proneness: Temperamental and cognitive 
components. Personality and Individual Differences, 14, 233-239. doi:10.1016/0191-
8869(93)90193-7 
London, H., Schubert, D. S., & Washburn, D. (1972). Increase of autonomic arousal by 
boredom. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 80, 29-36. doi: 10.1037/h0033311 
Maiuro, R. D., Vitaliano, P. P., & Cahn, T. S. (1987). A brief measure for the assessment of 
anger and aggression. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 2, 166-178. 
doi:10.1177/088626087002002003 
DIFFERENTIATING BOREDOM  31 
 
Martin, M., Sadlo, G., & Stew, G. (2006). The phenomenon of boredom. Qualitative 
Research in Psychology, 3, 193-211. doi:10.1191/1478088706qrp066oa 
Merrifield, C. & Danckert, J. (2014). Characterizing the psychophysiological signature of 
boredom. Journal of Experimental Brain Research, 232, 481–491. 
Mercer-Lynn, K. B., Bar, R. J., & Eastwood, J. D. (2014). Causes of boredom: The person, 
the situation, or both? Personality and Individual Differences, 56, 122-126. 
Mikulas, W. L., & Vodanovich, S. J. (1993). The essence of boredom. The Psychological 
Record, 43, 3-12. 
Miller, N. E. (1941). The frustration-aggression hypothesis. Psychological Review, 48, 337-
342. doi:10.1037/h0055861 
Millgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 67, 371-378. doi: 10.1037/h0040525 
Mooneyham, B. W., & Schooler, J. W. (2013). The costs and benefits of mind-wandering: a 
review. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 67, 11-18. 
doi:10.1037/a0031569 
Moynihan, A. B., Van Tilburg, W. A. P., Igou, E. R., Wisman, A., Donnelly, A. E., & 
Mulcraire, J. B. (2015). Eaten up by boredom: Consuming food to escape awareness 
of the bored self.  Frontiers in Psychology, 6:369. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00369 
Routledge, C., Wildschut, T., Sedikides, C., Juhl, J., & Arndt, J. (2012). The power of the 
past: Nostalgia as a meaning-making resource. Memory, 20, 452-460. 
doi:10.1080/09658211.2012.677452 
Roseman, I. J., Spindel, M. S., & Jose, P. E. (1990). Appraisals of emotion-eliciting events: 
Testing a theory of discrete emotions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
59, 899-915. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.59.5.899 
Roseman, I. J., Wiest, C., & Swartz, T. S. (1994). Phenomenology, behaviors, and goals 
differentiate discrete emotions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 
206-221. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.2.206 
DIFFERENTIATING BOREDOM  32 
 
Rusbult, C. E., Onizuka, R. K., & Lipkus, I. (1993). What do we really want?: Mental models 
of ideal romantic involvement explored through multidimensional scaling. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 493-527. doi:10.1006/jesp.1993.1023 
Russell, J. A., & Bullock, M. (1985). Multidimensional scaling of emotional facial 
expressions: Similarity from preschoolers to adults. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 48, 1290-1298. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.48.5.1290 
Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional intelligence. Imagination, Cognition and 
Personality, 9, 185-211. doi:10.2190/DUGG-P24E-52WK-6CDG 
Sansone, C., Weir, C., Harpster, L., & Morgan, C. (1992). Once a boring task always a boring 
task? Interest as a self-regulatory strategy. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 63, 379-390. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.63.3.379 
Scherer, K. R. (1984). On the nature and function of emotion: A component process approach. 
In K. R. Scherer & P. E. Ekman (Eds.), Approaches to Emotion (pp. 293-317). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L., & Jordan, A. H. (2008). Disgust as embodied moral 
judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1096-1109. 
doi:10.1177/0146167208317771 
Schönemann, P. H., & Carroll, R. M. (1970). Fitting one matrix to another under choice of a 
central dilation and a rigid motion. Psychometrika, 35, 245-255. doi:   
10.1007/BF02291266 
Schopenhauer, A., (1851, trans. 2009). The Essays of Arthur Shoppenhauer. BiblioBazaar, 
LLC. 
Schupak, C., & Rosenthal, J. (2009). Excessive daydreaming: A case history and discussion 
of mind wandering and high fantasy proneness. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 
290-292. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.10.002 
Sedikides, C., Wildschut, T., Arndt, J., & Routledge, C. (2008). Nostalgia: Past, present, and 
future. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17, 304-307. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8721.2008.00595.x 
DIFFERENTIATING BOREDOM  33 
 
Seli, P., Carriere, J. S., & Smilek, D. (2015). Not all mind wandering is created equal: 
Dissociating deliberate from spontaneous mind wandering. Psychological Research, 
79, 750-758. doi:10.1007/s00426-014-0617-x 
Shepard, R. N. (1980). Multidimensional scaling, tree-fitting, and clustering. Science, 210, 
390-398. doi:10.1126/science.210.4468.390 
Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 813-838. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.48.4.813 
Smith, R. P. (1981). Boredom: A review. Human Factors, 23, 329-340. 
doi:10.1177/001872088102300308 
Steger, M. F., Frazier, P., Oishi, S., & Kaler, M. (2006). The meaning in life questionnaire: 
Assessing the presence of and search for meaning in life. Journal of Counselling 
Psychology, 53, 80-93. doi:10.1037/0022-0167.53.1.80 
Thiele, L. P. (1997). Postmodernity and the routinization of novelty: Heidegger on boredom 
and technology. Polity, 29, 489-551. 
Van Tilburg, W. A., & Igou, E. R. (2011). On boredom and social identity: A pragmatic 
meaning-regulation approach. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 1679-
1691. doi:10.1177/0146167211418530 
Van Tilburg, W. A. P., & Igou, E. R. (2012). On boredom: Lack of challenge and meaning as 
distinct boredom experiences. Motivation and Emotion, 36, 181-194. 
doi:10.1007/s11031-011-9234-9 
Van Tilburg, W. A. P., & Igou, E. R. (2013). On the meaningfulness of behavior: An 
expectancy x value approach. Motivation and Emotion, 37, 373-388. 
doi:10.1007/s11031-012-9316-3 
Van Tilburg, W. A., Igou, E. R. (2016). Going to political extremes in response to boredom. 
European Journal of Social Psychology. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2205 
Van Tilburg, W. A. P., & Igou, E. R (in press). Can boredom help? Increased prosocial 
intentions in response to boredom. Self and Identity. 
doi:10.1080/15298868.2016.1218925 
DIFFERENTIATING BOREDOM  34 
 
Van Tilburg, W. A., Igou, E. R., & Sedikides, C. (2013). In search of meaningfulness: 
Nostalgia as an antidote to boredom. Emotion, 13, 450-461. doi:10.1037/a0030442 
Van Tilburg, W. A., Sedikides, C., & Wildschut, T. (2015). The mnemonic muse: Nostalgia 
fosters creativity through openness to experience. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 59, 1-7. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2015.02.002 
Van Tilburg, W. A. P., Wildschut, T., & Sedikides, C. (2016). Nostalgia’s place among self-
relevant emotions. Under review. King’s College London. 
Vodanovich, S. J., & Kass, S. J. (1990). Age and gender differences in boredom proneness. 
Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 5, 297-307. 
Vodanovich, S. J. (2003). Psychometric measures of boredom: A review of the literature. 
Journal of Psychology, 137, 569-595. doi:10.1080/00223980309600636 
Vodanovich, S. J., Verner, K. M., & Gilbride, T. V. (1991). Boredom proneness: Its 
relationship to positive and negative affect. Psychological Reports, 69, 1139-1146. 
doi:10.2466/pr0.1991.69.3f.1139 
Wallbott, H. G. (1998). Bodily expression of emotion. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 28, 879-896. 
Watt, J. D., & Vodanovich, S. J. (1999). Boredom proneness and psychosocial development. 
Journal of Psychology, 133, 303-314. doi:10.1080/00223989909599743 
Wildschut, T., Sedikides, C., Arndt, J., & Routledge, C. (2006). Nostalgia: Content, triggers, 
functions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 975-993. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.91.5.975 
  
Running Head: DIFFERENTIATING BOREDOM   
Table 1: Correlation Matrix of State Emotions (Study 2) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Boredom -          
2 Sadness -.012 -         
3 Anger .064 .664 -        
4 Frustration .114 .618 .718 -       
5 Fear .116 .641 .553 .431 -      
6 Disgust .026 .581 .698 .639 .439 -     
7 Feeling Depressed .152 .559 .462 .433 .474 .317 -    
8 Guilt .137 .479 .475 .468 .571 .303 .509 -   
9 Shame .103 .654 .543 .521 .589 .570 .470 .654 -  
10 Regret .158 .479 .416 .333 .593 .227 .571 .721 .519 - 
11 Disappointment .083 .631 .682 .592 .538 .717 .401 .379 .647 .357 
Note: Correlation coefficients larger than .17 are significant at the .05-level. 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Individual Differences in Emotions (Study 3) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Boredom -          
2 Sadness .379 -         
3 Anger .414 .570 -        
4 Frustration .452 .728 .602 -       
5 Fear .354 .665 .557 .571 -      
6 Disgust .402 .584 .614 .553 .524 -     
7 Feeling Depressed .483 .831 .493 .721 .574 .495 -    
8 Guilt .413 .584 .490 .583 .639 .625 .596 -   
9 Shame .375 .521 .447 .496 .625 .604 .528 .819 -  
10 Regret .469 .671 .510 .650 .561 .604 .662 .719 .671 - 
11 Disappointment .532 .748 .589 .738 .557 .572 .704 .602 .567 .745 
Note: All correlation coefficients are significant at the .05-level. 
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Table 3: Explained Variance of the Appraisals Across Studies 
 Study 1
  
Study 2  Study 3 
  Total 
R
2 
R
2 
Without 
Boredom  
R
2 
Difference 
 Total 
R
2
 
R
2 
Without 
Boredom  
R
2 
Difference 
 Total 
R
2
 
R
2 
Without 
Boredom  
R
2 
Difference 
Valence  0.37 0.10 0.281  0.35 0.23 0.126  0.24 0.13 0.125 
Arousal  0.76 0.78 -0.025  0.45 0.16 0.295  0.66 0.55 0.116 
Morality  0.80 0.73 0.073  0.47 0.11 0.364  0.47 0.32 0.154 
Challenge  0.32 0.34 -0.036  0.48 0.05 0.443  0.31 0.13 0.173 
Meaning  0.32 0.21 0.112  0.86 0.19 0.671  0.37 0.03 0.351 
Attention  0.65 0.67 -0.024  0.76 0.26 0.502  0.70 0.43 0.272 
Note: Subscripts indicate the relative size of Difference in R
2
, from highest (1) to lowest (6) within each study.     
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Figure 1: Differences between Emotion Concepts with Superimposed Appraisals (Study 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dots represent emotion positions on dimension 1 (horizontal) and 2 (vertical). Ellipses 
around emotions represent their bootstrapped 95% confidence regions. Vectors indicate 
orientation (angle) and fit (length) of superimposed appraisals, with italicized labels. 
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Figure 2: Differences between Emotion States with Superimposed Appraisals (Study 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dots represent emotion positions on dimension 1 (horizontal) and 2 (vertical). Ellipses around emotions represent their bootstrapped 95% 
confidence regions. Vectors indicate orientation (angle) and fit (length) of superimposed appraisals, with italicized labels. 
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Figure 3: Differences between Emotion States with Superimposed Appraisals (Study 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dots represent emotion positions on dimension 1 (horizontal) and 2 (vertical). Ellipses around emotions represent their bootstrapped 95% 
confidence regions. Vectors indicate orientation (angle) and fit (length) of superimposed appraisals, with italicized labels. 
